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 THE VARIETIES OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
DANIEL H. COLE* 
 “Comparative institutional analysis” (CIA) often is treated as a singular 
approach to diagnosing and potentially resolving social cost problems (or 
social dilemmas). In fact, the label represents a family of related but 
importantly different approaches, based on the different conceptions of 
“institutions,” as well as different processes or functions individual scholars 
are attempting to describe and explain. This contribution to 
a Festshcrift honoring Neil Komesar, the legal scholar most commonly 
associated with the CIA methodology, begins by highlighting a myriad of 
definitions of the word “institution,” offers a functional account of alternative 
definitions of that term, and attempts to demonstrate the utility of alternative 
approaches to CIA by comparing and contrasting the substantially different, 
but equally effective, ways it has been employed in the works of Komesar 
and Elinor Ostrom. The comparison yields a possible approach to reconciling 
Komesar’s treatment of institutions with that of Ostrom’s fellow Nobel 
Laureate, Douglass North. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The roots of institutional analysis extend as far back as Plato’s 
Republic1 and Aristotle’s Politics.2 Modern variants of the approach have 
a common antecedent in the German historical school of the first decade 
of the twentieth century.3 However, most institutional analysis has not 
 
 * Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, School of Public and 
Environmental Policy, and Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and 
Policy Analysis. The author is grateful to Peter Grossman, Neil Komesar, and Mike 
McGinnis for helpful comments on drafts of this Article. 
 1. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1945) (n.d.). 
 2. See ARISTOTLE, Politica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1127 (Richard 
McKeon ed. & trans., Random House 1941) (n.d.). 
 3. See GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, GRUNDRISS DER ALLGEMEINEN 
VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE (1904); Rudolf Richter, Bridging Old and New Institutional 
Economics: Gustav Schmoller, the Leader of the Younger German Historical School, 
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been comparative in nature. Scholars have often expressed preferences 
for one institution (or set of institutions) over others, but without any 
kind of scientific metric for comparing the social welfare implications of 
alternative institutional arrangements.4 Ronald H. Coase himself 
criticized the “Old Institutionalists,” including John R. Commons, 
Thorstein Veblen, and Westley Mitchell, on precisely that ground, noting 
that they amassed mountains of data, “waiting for a theory, or a fire.”5 It 
was Coase who provided the first truly useful metric—transaction 
costs—for comparing institutions, thereby setting the stage for a “New 
Institutional Economics.”6 Alternative institutional arrangements could 
finally be compared according to a consistent metric to determine which 
would maximize social welfare (or the social product) by minimizing the 
costs of transacting. 
Even after Coase, as Neil Komesar so often has pointed out, many 
scholars continued to engage in single institutional analysis, sometimes 
despite claims that they were doing comparative institutional analysis 
(CIA).7 Harold Demsetz’s famous 1967 article, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, is a case in point.8 He purported to compare 
 
Seen with Neoinstitutionalists’ Eyes, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 567 
(1996).  
 4. Of course, scholars often advocated for some institutions over others, but 
that was often a matter of personal, often ideologically based, preference rather than a 
legitimate comparison of social welfare outcomes. 
 5. Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
& THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 230 (1984) [hereinafter Coase, New Institutional 
Economics]. On the other hand, Coase has also written that “we have less to fear from 
institutionalists who are not theorists than from theorists who are not institutionalists.” 
Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 194, 196 (1964) [hereinafter Coase, Regulated Industries]. It has been argued, 
meanwhile, that Coase overstated the extent to which “Old Institutionalism” lacked a 
theoretical foundation. See Victor Nee, The New Institutionalisms in Economics and 
Sociology, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 49, 50 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
 6. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 2 (1959) [hereinafter Coase, Federal Communications]; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 1, 5–6 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Problem of Social Cost]; Coase, New 
Institutional Economics, supra note 5, at 230. 
 7. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1994). 
 8. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 354–59 (1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Property Rights]. That 
Demsetz engaged in single institutional analysis while purporting to engage in 
comparative institutional analysis is ironic given his strong condemnation (just two years 
later) of the “nirvana approach,” whereby an existing imperfect institutional arrangement 
is compared with some “ideal norm.” See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: 
Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969). His Toward a Theory of Property Rights 
exemplifies perfectly the “nirvana approach.” 
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common-property regimes and (individual) private property solutions for 
averting what Garrett Hardin, writing a year later, called the “tragedy of 
the commons.”9 Demsetz was trying to explain why it is that the 
institution of (individual) private property seems to arise in just about 
every society at some stage in its socioeconomic development. Based on 
highly unrealistic assumptions about political governance,10 Demsetz 
found that effective common-property solutions are impeded by high 
transaction costs.11 Therefore, he concluded, (individual) private property 
becomes socially preferable.12 Having spent the bulk of the article 
examining the transaction (or transition) costs of converting pre-existing 
unregulated common-property systems into regulated common-property 
systems,13 including the likelihood of strategic behavior (such as 
holdouts), Demsetz made no effort to estimate the costs of converting 
from a common-property regime to a private property regime. A more 
realistic assessment would have compared the estimated costs (and 
benefits) of complete privatization with the estimated costs of continued 
management under an amended common-property regime.14 
Coase’s truer followers, including Komesar, eschew such simplistic 
and patently insufficient analyses in favor of the more difficult and 
complex task of actually comparing the costs and benefits of alternative 
institutional arrangements (including both property rights regimes and 
regulatory instruments), which really is the only way of avoiding 
ideology-based nostrums. So, for example, in his book Law’s Limits, 
Komesar criticizes Richard Epstein’s approach to regulatory takings law 
 
 9. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244,  
1247–48 (1968); Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 8. 
 10. After studying the history of the emergence of family property rights in a 
Canadian indigenous tribe, Demsetz posits a uniquely democratic tribe, for which any 
changes to a pre-existing common-property regime that amount to open access for 
individual members of the tribe must be agreed to by unanimous agreement of all tribe 
members; any member who does not agree may continue harvesting animal fur under the 
pre-existing rules. Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 8, at 351–54. As a consequence, 
the transaction costs of transitioning from an unregulated common-property regime to 
regulated access for tribe members could well be very costly, in part because of strategic 
behavior driven by market incentives. Id. at 355. Even if Demsetz’s assumptions of (1) 
unregulated access for tribe members under the existing regime and (2) a purely 
democratic tribe operating pursuant to a rule of unanimous consent for rule changes were 
not patently unrealistic, that still would not justify his lack of attention to the costs of 
transitioning from the pre-existing common-property regime to a regime of individual, 
private ownership.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 356. 
 13. Id. at 356–59. 
 14. This is not to say that Demsetz’s arguments about the virtues of private 
ownership for reducing both negative externalities and transaction costs, compared to 
alternative property/regulatory solutions are incorrect; it is just that his analysis is 
insufficient to support that claim. 
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for failing to adequately consider the costs of greatly expanding access to 
the courts for aggrieved property owners versus the costs of failing to 
provide broader judicial remedies. More specifically, Komesar explains 
that Epstein (1) focuses on the wrong political malfunction, majoritarian 
bias, when most such takings result (pursuant to theories of collective 
action) 15 from minoritarian bias, which the “just compensation” clause is 
not designed to ameliorate;16 and (2) neglects the supply-side constraints 
that limit the ability of the judiciary to resolve more than a small fraction 
of the regulatory takings claims that Epstein’s inclusive definition would 
generate.17 Even if “[t]here is much to be said for an expansive vision of 
the Takings Clause, in general, and of regulatory takings, in particular,” 
Komesar believes that Epstein’s expansive regulatory takings rule would 
require a “judiciary so massive that it would alter the basic character of 
the judiciary,” leading potentially to a political backlash against the 
courts.18 Komesar concludes that society, including, ironically, most 
property owners, might well be better off with the legislative 
malfunctions than under alternative judicial malfunctions that would 
likely occur if courts were required more often to intervene between 
governments and landowners.19 
Whether or not one agrees (as I do) with Komesar’s conclusion, the 
great virtue of his approach is obvious: it is not good enough to identify 
an institutional malfunction (a type of social cost problem) and 
recommend an alternative institutional solution that may also fail 
(sometimes for the same reasons). This leads only to an institutional 
cycling problem as market failures lead to purported government 
solutions, which then lead to government failures, giving rise to calls for 
market solutions. It is better to avoid this cycling problem by comparing 
the expected costs associated with any recommended institutional 
 
 15. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 181 (2001) [hereinafter KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS] 
(discussing the distribution of stakes across a population); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) 
(proposing rational individuals will not advance common group goals at the expense of 
personal welfare unless coerced to do so); KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the 
distribution of stakes across a population).  
 16. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 15, at 94–95. In such cases, just 
compensation merely spreads the costs among taxpayers rather than focusing the costs on 
the beneficiaries of the expropriation. As a consequence, it actually exacerbates existing 
incentives for interest groups to engage in rent-seeking activity via government 
expropriations.  
 17. Id. at 91, 94–95. 
 18. Id. at 91, 99. 
 19. Id. at 106. For evidence that Komesar’s relative trust in the political process 
as the least bad solution may be well placed, see, for example, Daniel H. Cole, Political 
Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (2007).  
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solution with the observed costs of the alleged institutional failure. 
Komesar’s recommendation of CIA is a direct outgrowth of Coase’s 
injunction against the presumption that market failures automatically 
warrant government intervention because we must also account for the 
costs of likely government failures.20 
Institutional analysis generally, and CIA in particular, are taught and 
used not only by scholars in law and economics but across the social 
sciences,21 which creates exciting interdisciplinary possibilities but also 
significant difficulties, as variable meanings become attached to words 
like “institution” and “organization” (among others).22 This Article is 
about the already wide diversity of approaches to comparative 
institutional analysis across disciplines, and the increasing need for a 
common thesaurus (rather than a common dictionary) for 
cross-disciplinary communication and learning about institutions and 
their social-ecological consequences. 
Part I of this Article examines the numerous ways in which CIA is 
actually deployed across disciplines, with special attention to differential 
definitions of common terms. Neil Komesar’s approach and definitions 
will be compared with those of other social scientists, including Ronald 
Coase, Douglass North, and Elinor Ostrom. Part II then focuses on 
alternative approaches to CIA offered by Komesar and Ostrom not so 
much to establish that one approach is preferable to another, but to 
demonstrate that lack of complete agreement on vocabulary and 
analytical variables is not an insufferable problem. As we shall see, 
different definitions of common concepts, such as “institution,” seem to 
be selected largely for functional reasons,23 based on the specific types of 
questions a particular analyst is trying to understand and explain. 
However, the use of variable definitions can create misunderstandings 
and impede effective communication if scholars are less than clear about 
how they define terms relative to the wider, cross-disciplinary literature. 
The bottom line of this Article is that CIA is a very powerful, indeed 
crucial, tool for policy making for social welfare,24 but one characterized 
 
 20. Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5, at 194–95. 
 21. See generally W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: 
IDEAS AND INTERESTS (3d ed. 2008) (presenting similarities and differences of 
institutional theories). 
 22. This is a point I made in an earlier review essay of Neil Komesar’s book, 
Law’s Limits. See Daniel H. Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law’s 
Limits, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 261, 263–64 (2004). 
 23. Komesar admits a functional reason for his own definition of “institution.” 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 9. And, as we shall see, other 
scholars’ definitions seem chosen to serve similarly functional purposes. See infra notes 
26-44 and accompanying text. 
 24. Even if one is not persuaded to go along with the somewhat extreme 
institutional determinism of DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS 
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by great variation in design and use across the social sciences, and those 
(largely functional) variations must be appreciated across disciplines in 
order to maximize the tool’s value. 
I. THE WORKING PARTS OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In this Part, I address how approaches to CIA differ across scholars 
and across disciplines. Two elements are central to the variation we see 
in CIAs: (1) definitions of terms, such as “institution” and 
“organization,” which determine the focus or scope of analysis; and (2) 
the evaluative criteria used to compare alternative institutions or sets of 
institutions. 
Before one can engage in any form of CIA, one must define (if only 
implicitly) what is meant by an “institution.” Despite the fact that 
institutional analysis (comparative or otherwise) has been with us for a 
very long time—the term “institution” reportedly was first used by 
Giambattista Vico in his 1725 book Scienza Nouva25—surprisingly little 
agreement exists on the meaning of that rather ordinary-seeming term. In 
fact, “institution” seems to have nearly as many definitions as definers. 
Sometimes, the term is defined only implicitly. More problematically for 
interdisciplinary understanding, some definitions are not compatible with 
others. Here is a fairly representative sample (in no particular order) from 
various social-scientific literatures. 
 
Neil Komesar (law):  
Institutions for me are large-scale social decision-making 
processes—markets, communities, political processes, and 
courts. I use the choice among these institutional processes to 
clarify basic issues such as the roles of regulation, rights, 
governments, and capitalism. These processes are alternative 
mechanisms by which societies carry out their goals.26 
 
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012), no one today would 
argue that institutions are anything less than very important contributing factors to social 
welfare. 
 25. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, What Are Institutions?, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 1, 1 
(2006). 
 26. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 15, at 31. Komesar is, by his own 
admission, not entirely consistent in his treatment of organizations as institutions. Id. For 
example, he concedes that for functional reasons he treats some organizations, such as 
labor unions and corporations, as actors rather than institutions, while acknowledging that 
they might be, and sometimes are, treated under his rubric as institutions. KOMESAR, 
supra note 7, at 10. This would have been problematic, had Komesar not been clear at the 
outset about what he was including and what he was excluding from his CIA. Even so, he 
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Ronald Coase (economics):  
Contemplation of an optimal system may suggest ways of 
improving the system . . . [and] it may go far to providing a 
solution. But in general its influence has been pernicious. It has 
directed economists’ attention away from the main question, 
which is how alternative arrangements will actually work in 
practice. . . . Until we realize that we are choosing between 
social arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are 
not likely to make much headway. . . . The kind of question 
which usually has to be decided is, for example, whether the 
administrative structure of an agency should be changed or a 
certain provision in a statute amended. That is to say, what we 
are normally concerned with are social arrangements and what 
is economically relevant is how the allocation and use of 
factors of production will change with a change in social 
arrangements.27 
Douglass North (economics):  
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional 
change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence 
is the key to understanding historical change.28 
Gustav von Schmoller (economics):  
“[A] partial order for community life which serves specific 
purposes and which has the capacity to undergo further 
evolution independently. It offers a firm basis for shaping 
social actions over long periods of time; as for example 
property, slavery, serfhood (sic), marriage, guardianship, 
market system, coinage system, freedom of trade.”  
. . . . 
 
might have usefully offered a more definite, consistent analytical basis for determining 
when organizations should be included versus excluded from the term “institution.” 
 27. Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5, at 195.  
 28. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). 
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[Organizations, then,] are the personal side of the institution.29 
Vincent Ostrom (political science):  
“[I]nstitutions are defined as systems of rule-ordered 
relationships,”30 where “[r]ules are linguistic structures that 
enable human beings to distinguish the realm of all possible 
actions into those that are prohibited, permitted, and 
required…. Rules thus establish constraints that allow for 
predictability in human relationships, while leaving open a 
range of possibilities to take account of other calculations that 
impinge on human welfare.”31 
Elinor Ostrom (political science):  
Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans 
use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured 
interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, 
markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, 
and governments at all scales. 
. . . .  
 The opportunities and constraints individuals face in any 
particular situation, the information they obtain, the benefits 
they obtain or are excluded from, and how they reason about 
the situation are all affected by the rules or absence of rules 
that structure the situation.32 
Susan Crawford and Elinor Ostrom (political science):  
We use the broad term institutional statement to . . . refer[] to a 
shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, 
permits, or advises actions or outcomes for actors (both 
individual and corporate). Institutional statements are spoken, 
written, or tacitly understood in a form intelligible to actors in 
an empirical setting. In theoretical analyses, institutional 
 
 29. EIRIK FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 6, 7 (1998) 
(quoting VON SCHMOLLER, supra note 3, at 61). 
 30. VINCENT OSTROM, Conceptualizing the Nature and Magnitude of the Task 
of Institutional Analysis and Development, in 2 THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND HUMAN 
AFFAIRS: ESSAYS ON COLLECTIVE, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND EPISTEMIC CHOICE 181, 191 
(Barbara Allen ed., 2012). 
 31. Id. at 190. 
 32. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 3 (2005).  
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statements will often be interpretations or abstractions of 
empirical constraints and opportunities.33 
Elinor Ostrom (political science):  
 “Institutions” can be defined as the set of working rules 
that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in 
some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what 
aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be 
followed, what information must or must not be provided, and 
what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their 
actions. All rules contain prescriptions that forbid, permit, or 
require some action or outcome. Working rules are those 
actually used, monitored, and enforced when individuals make 
choices about the actions they will take.34 
Thorstein Veblen (economics):  
[M]en order their lives by . . . principles and, practically, 
entertain no question of their stability and finality. That is what 
is meant by calling them institutions; they are settled habits of 
thought common to the generality of men.35  
 
[An institution is] a usage which has become axiomatic and 
indispensable by habituation and general acceptance.36 
C. Reinold Noyes (economics):  
[T]he arrangements, the practices and the rules of 
society . . . .37 
 
 33. Sue E.S. Crawford & Elinor Ostrom, A Grammar of Institutions, 89 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 582, 583 (1995) (citation omitted). Crawford and Ostrom adopt this broad 
definition of “institutional statement” to encompass all three of the general approaches 
they find in the literature: institutions as equilibria, institutions as norms, and institutions 
as rules. Id. 
 34. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 51 (1990) (citations omitted). 
 35. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 239 (1919). 
 36. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN 
RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA 101 n.1 (1967); see also William T. Waller, Jr., 
The Evolution of the Veblenian Dichotomy: Veblen, Hamilton, Ayres, and Foster, 16 J. 
ECON. ISSUES 757, 759 (1982). 
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Walter Hamilton (economics): 
 I[nstitution] is a verbal symbol which for want of a better 
describes a cluster of social usages. It connotes a way of 
thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is 
embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people. 
In ordinary speech it is another word for procedure, 
convention, or arrangement; in the language of books it is the 
singular of which the mores or the folkways are the plural. 
Institutions fix the confines of and impose form upon the 
activities of human beings. The world of use and wont, to 
which imperfectly we accommodate our lives, is a tangled and 
unbroken web of institutions.38 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson (economics):  
[W]e may define institutions as systems of established and 
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. 
Language, money, law, systems of weights and measures, table 
manners, and firms (and other organizations) are thus all 
institutions.39 
Masahiko Aoki (economics):  
An institution is a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs 
about how the game is played. Its substance is a compressed 
representation of the salient, invariant features of an 
equilibrium path, perceived by almost all the agents in the 
domain as relevant to their own strategic choices. As such it 
governs the strategic interactions of the agents in a 
self-enforcing manner and in turn is reproduced by their actual 
choices in a continually changing environment.40 
Randall Calvert (political science):  
[T]here is, strictly speaking, no separate animal that we can 
identify as an institution. There is only rational behavior, 
 
 37. C. REINOLD NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY: A STUDY OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT, SUBSTANCE, AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY IN 
MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 2 (1936). 
 38. Walter H. Hamilton, Institution, in 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 84, 84 (Edwin R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1932). 
 39. Hodgson, supra note 25, at 2 (citation omitted). 
 40. MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 26 
(2001). 
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conditioned on expectations about the behavior and reactions 
of others. When these expectations about others’ behavior take 
on a particularly clear and concrete form across individuals, 
when they apply to situations that recur over a long period of 
time, and especially when they involve highly variegated and 
specific expectations about the different roles of different 
actors in determining what actions others should take, we often 
collect these expectations and strategies under the heading 
institution.41 
Everett C. Hughes (sociology):  
(1) a set of mores or formal rules, or both, which can be 
fulfilled only by (2) people acting collectively, in established 
complementary capacities or offices. The first element 
represents consistency; the second concert or organization.42 
A. Allan Schmid (economics):  
 Institutions are human relationships that structure 
opportunities via constraints and enablement. A constraint on 
one person is opportunity for another. Institutions enable 
individuals to do what they cannot do alone. They structure 
incentives used in calculating individual advantage. They also 
affect beliefs and preferences and provide cues to uncalculated 
action. They provide order and predictability to human 
interaction.43 
W. Richard Scott (sociology):  
Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated 
activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social 
life.44 
This is not the place for a detailed parsing of these various 
definitions of “institution” (a comparative analysis of “institutions,” if 
you will), but several points of differentiation are worth exploring. First, 
 
 41. Randall L. Calvert, Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions, in 
EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 57, 73–74 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1995).  
 42. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Institutions, in AN OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPLES 
OF SOCIOLOGY 283, 287 (Robert E. Park ed., 1939) (emphasis omitted).  
 43. A. ALLAN SCHMID, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 1 (2004). 
 44. SCOTT, supra note 21, at 48. 
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observe that some social scientists writing about “institutions,” for 
instance Elinor Ostrom, have adopted multiple definitions. She defined 
the term somewhat differently in works she wrote at different times and 
to different ends.45 However, as I explain later in this Article, Ostrom’s 
various definitions, properly understood, are mutually compatible, and 
also are compatible with Douglass North’s consistent and strict definition 
of the term. The apparent differences among them are explained by the 
different functions she intended the term to serve within the specific 
analysis. 
Important differences among several definitions of “institution” can 
be dichotomized along one or both of two dimensions: inclusive versus 
exclusive (of organizations) and static versus dynamic.46 
 
 45. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 46. Because some listed authors are not entirely clear about these issues, not all 
authors are listed on one side or the other of each dichotomy. The static versus dynamic 
dichotomy may be partially vitiated by the recognition of some proponents of a dynamic 
approach to institutional analysis, such as North, that some institutions, most notably 
deep-rooted informal institutions, are very slow and difficult to change because of path 
dependencies, vested interests, and other reasons. See generally NORTH, supra note 28 
(illustrating and explaining the reasons for incremental institutional change). 
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TABLE 1 
INCLUSIVE VERSUS EXCLUSIVE DEFINITIONS 
 
“Institutions” Includes 
Organizations 
“Institutions” Excludes 
Organizations 
• Komesar 
•  Coase 
•  von Schmoller 
•  Veblen 
•  Noyes 
•  Hamilton 
•  Hodgson 
•  Hughes 
•  Scott 
•  Calvert 
• North 
• V. Ostrom 
• E. Ostrom 
• Veblen 
• Aoki 
• Schmidt 
 
TABLE 2 
STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC DEFINITIONS 
 
“Institutions” Are Completely 
Static/Immutable 
“Institutions” Are Substantially 
Dynamic 
• Veblen 
• Hamilton 
• Komesar 
• Coase 
• North 
• von Schmoller 
• V. Ostrom 
• E. Ostrom 
• Noyes 
• Hodgson 
• Aoki 
• Schmidt 
• Calvert 
 
Another obvious point of differentiation concerns the relative 
influence of alternative definitions across the social-scientific literatures. 
Douglass North’s seems to be the one most often mentioned throughout 
the social sciences, though this remains an untested hypothesis; if true, it 
is ironic because North’s definition deviates perhaps more than any other 
from accepted usages of “institutions” in common parlance. For 
example, North happens to be a Senior Fellow at the “Hoover 
Institution,”47 which in his vocabulary is not an institution at all but an 
 
 47. Douglass C. North, HOOVER INST., http://www.hoover.org/fellows/10069 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
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organization. To him (and to other scholars who exclude organizations 
from their definitions of “institution”), organizations like the Hoover 
Institution are “groups of individuals bound together by some common 
purpose to achieve objectives.”48 As such, they operate pursuant to their 
own set of institutions (corporate bylaws, organizational rules and norms, 
church doctrine, etc.), and are strongly influenced by external societal 
institutions, including both formal laws and informal social norms. As 
actors in a wider society, organizations, in turn, may influence that 
society’s institutional choices. 
If North’s use of the term is the most prevalent (or, at least, the most 
often cited among social scientists), even his fellow “New 
Institutionalists” often deviate from it, as evidenced by the definitions 
from Coase and Aoki.49 Coase, in fact, does not even use the term 
“institution,” let alone the phrase “comparative institutional analysis,” 
despite his well-deserved reputation for (1) providing a useful metric for 
making institutional comparisons and (2) calling for comparative 
analyses of alternative “social arrangements.”50 Coase’s use of the phrase 
“social arrangements” implies a concern with choice of both rules and 
organizational structures. He observes that we can change the structure 
of an organization (such as a government agency), the rules under which 
it operates, or both.51 Similarly, Komesar’s focus on legal 
decision-making processes, including voluntary market contracting, 
legislative enactments (via political processes at various levels of 
government), and judicial rulings, implies a strong interest in 
organizational choice. 
Once a scholar has settled on a definition of “institutions” to serve 
her or his purpose(s), the next major decision is to adopt a criterion or 
criteria for comparison. Alternatives include (but might not be limited 
to): (1) subjective value judgments based on ideological commitments or 
beliefs; (2) net social welfare comparisons incorporating Coasean 
transaction-cost analysis; (3) a Rawlsian “maximin” principle; (4) 
Amartya Sen’s “capability approach;” or (5) net maximization of Harold 
Lasswell’s eight “value terms” (including power, enlightenment, wealth, 
 
 48. See NORTH, supra note 28, at 5. 
 49. See supra notes 27, 40 and accompanying text. Another case in point: 
North’s student Avner Greif incorporates organizations as part and parcel of his 
institutional analysis. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN 
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 29 (2006). 
 50. See Coase, Federal Communications, supra note 6; Coase, Problem of 
Social Cost, supra note 6; Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5. 
 51. See Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5, at 194. 
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well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude).52 Both (3) and (4) 
point in the direction of preferring institutions (or sets of institutions) that 
relieve poverty, thereby increasing social opportunities for the worst-off 
in society (which might not necessarily be inconsistent with social 
welfare maximization).53 Among the first generation of Old 
Institutionalists and many self-described libertarians, the first evaluative 
criterion generally seems (to me at least) to be most common (which is 
not to say that those who prefer the second or third criteria are devoid of 
ideological bias—no one is). Among New Institutionalists who engage in 
real CIA, the overwhelming majority adopt a social-welfare approach, 
which requires attention to the likely effects of alternative institutional 
arrangements on the costs of transacting (among other costs, possibly 
including “demoralization costs” arising from institutional arrangements 
that reduce incentives to undertake productive investments54).55 At least 
one New Institutionalist, Elinor Ostrom, has cited Lasswell as an 
important influence.56 
The differences in definitions of the objects of analysis (institutions) 
and the existence of alternative evaluative criteria might suggest that CIA 
is not a single analytical approach but a family of approaches with points 
of similarity and points of difference, which might or might not be in 
need of standardization. However, the following Part argues for a 
functionalist explanation of alternative definitions of “institution,” 
according to which preferred definitions depend on the specific rule 
choices and/or organizational choices the scholar is attempting to 
understand and explain within his or her analytical framework. On this 
view, the plurality of definitions of “institution” is not a problem in and 
of itself, except to the extent it can impede communication between 
scholars who use the term differently. 
The problem of varying evaluative criteria is, I suppose, less 
problematic. To the extent conclusions are based on ideological priors, 
 
 52. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 18 (1971);  
1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: 
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 377 (1992). 
 53. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152–54 (1971); 
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985). 
 54. On “demoralization costs,” see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1165, 1214–16 (1967). 
 55. E.g., ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 24; KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 105–09; KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 15, at  
15–16, 20–21; NORTH, supra note 28; Cole, supra note 19. 
 56. Elinor Ostrom, The Ten Most Important Books, 4 TIDSSKRIFTET POLITIK 36 
(2004); see also Matthew Auer, Contexts, Multiple Methods, and Values in the Study of 
Common-Pool Resources, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 215, 225 (2006). 
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outcomes of analyses are essentially predetermined and actual 
comparisons otiose. Evaluative criteria that offer potentially practicable 
measures of consequences, such as some approach to maximizing a 
social-welfare function or some other values, whether those of Rawls, 
Sen, or Lasswell, are to be preferred; it seems reasonable that different 
scholars might prefer different measures.57 All we can reasonably 
demand is that scholars be as clear as possible not only about their 
definitions of key concepts, such as “institution” and “organization,” but 
also about the evaluative criteria they are using to compare outcomes 
under alternative institutional arrangements. 
II. THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
This Part compares Neil Komesar’s approach to CIA with that of 
the late Elinor Ostrom. The purpose is not to suggest that one’s approach 
is superior to that of the other, but only to explain that both approaches 
are legitimate, given the social dilemmas (or social-cost problems) each 
scholar is attempting to understand and explain, and to illustrate the 
alternative kinds of approaches and assessments that CIA generally 
permits. 
In his book Imperfect Alternatives, Komesar unapologetically offers 
a functional explanation of his approach to CIA: 
Although, for the purposes of this book, I lump institutions 
together into three general categories, market, political, and 
adjudicative, there is no magic about these categories. 
Institutions can be defined and aggregated in any number of 
ways depending on the focus for study. The categories are a 
compromise between conflicting analytical objectives—my 
desire to show the broad spectrum of institutional choice and 
my desire to examine law-related issues.58 
 
 57. But see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
(2002) (claiming that any approach focusing on equity or fairness in distribution, as a 
maximand independent of social welfare, logically entails a commitment to policies that 
would make everyone in society worse off). Following John Stuart Mill, who directly 
connected notions of justice and utility, Kaplow and Shavell argue that distributional 
concerns can be, and are most appropriately, subsumed within a more general social 
welfare-based analysis. Id. After all, individuals express a “taste for . . . fairness.” Id. at 
21; see also JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM ch. 5 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1979) (1863). 
 58. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 9 (emphasis added). 
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The starting point for Komesar’s CIA is found in Coase’s 1964 
discussion,59 which argued for equal attention to both government 
failures and market failures, in recognition that all of our available 
mechanisms for resolving social-cost problems are likely to fail, to 
greater or lesser extents, in any particular set of circumstances.60 
Consequently, our normative goal in making institutional choices should 
be to choose those social arrangements that, in the circumstances, are 
either least likely to fail or likely to fail the least. This is, in short, the 
basis for all of Komesar’s assessments comparing market, legislative, 
and judicial allocations of entitlements to resources. His CIA is, in 
essence, Coase’s CIA, but applied to a somewhat different 
institutional-choice set; they both include some organizations in their 
definitions of “institution,” but they are concerned with different sets of 
organizations (or decision-making processes). For Coase, the focus of 
attention is on market versus firm versus government, by which he 
means primarily legislative and administrative determinations of 
allocations. For Komesar, the relevant choice set is markets (including 
firms, in contrast to Coase), legislative bodies, and courts. 
Komesar’s approach to “institutional” choice (others scholars might 
well label it “organizational” choice) is decidedly Coasean.61 He 
compares and contrasts markets, courts, and legislative bodies for 
resolving various kinds of legal/social-cost conflicts (but with a 
relatively heavier focus on courts), and reaches some surprising 
conclusions. For example, as noted earlier, Komesar’s CIA of the 
judicial doctrine of regulatory takings law in Law’s Limits leads him to 
conclude that the game may not be worth the candle largely because of 
supply-side constraints (numbers of judges and courtrooms) and 
remedy-related problems. Specifically, “just compensation” is not an 
appropriate remedy in cases where takings result from minoritarian 
dysfunctions, that is, interest-group pressure, rather than majoritarian 
bias, because it allocates costs to the wrong group of people and 
compounds incentive problems that result in too many expropriations.62 
Consequently, he expects that the legislative process may be the best 
hope private property owners have, even if legislatures are also primarily 
responsible for the problem in the first place.63 
 
 59. See Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5. 
 60. See id. 
 61.  By “Coasean,” I refer to Coase’s real concern with production and 
allocation of entitlements to resources in the real world of positive transaction costs, as 
opposed to the mythical world of what George Stigler (mis)labeled the “Coase theorem.” 
See RONALD H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM THE MARKET 
AND THE LAW 157 (1988); Coase, Problem of Social Cost, supra note 6, at 15–44. 
 62. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 63. Id. 
400 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
More generally, Komesar’s approach to CIA has taught us a number 
of useful lessons about the nature, scope, and direction of 
institutional/organizational malfunction, including the important and 
insightful observation that institutions tend to “fail together,” by which 
he means that markets, legislative bodies, and courts often fail at the 
same time and for the same reasons (if not to the same extent).64 
While Komesar includes some (but not all)65 organizations in his 
definition of “institutions,” Elinor Ostrom seems to exclude them entirely 
from her definition. As noted earlier, Ostrom specified several 
definitions of “institutions” in constructing an elaborate system (replete 
with grammars, syntax, frameworks, theories, and models) for 
diagnosing, analyzing, and resolving social dilemmas (or social-cost 
problems).66 In one definition, she focused on the “institutional 
statement” as a “shared linguistic constraint or opportunity.”67 In two 
others, she adopted operational (as opposed to linguistic) definitions of 
“institution,” both of which are variants of North’s conception68: (1) the 
“working rules” that forbid, permit, or require actions by some actor or 
group of actors (e.g., an organization) and (2) “prescriptions” that 
structure social interactions.69 Ostrom’s various definitions are not at all 
inconsistent; they reflect various functions the term “institutions” served 
for Ostrom in different analytical and grammatical settings. 
Ostrom and coauthor Sue Crawford adopted the linguistic definition 
(“institutional statement”) in an attempt to construct an internally 
consistent grammar for institutional analysis that could be used across 
disciplines. The “working rules” definition was specified in Ostrom’s 
most comprehensive exegesis of her Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework.70 And the definition of “institutions” as 
“prescriptions,” which is hardly distinguishable from “institutions” as 
“working rules,” appears in Governing the Commons, where she 
examined common property regimes as institutional solutions to actual 
common-pool resource problems.71 Each of the three definitions of 
“institution” is connected inextricably to Ostrom’s IAD framework. 
Thus, we need to understand something of her IAD framework to 
appreciate her functional preference for a definition of “institutions,” 
which excludes organizations from its ambit. 
 
 64. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 23. 
 65. See id. at 9–10. 
 66. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Crawford & Ostrom, supra note 33. 
 68. Indeed, Elinor Ostrom quoted and explicitly embraced North’s definition of 
“institutions.” OSTROM, supra note 32, at 179.  
 69. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 70. See OSTROM, supra note 32. 
 71. See OSTROM, supra note 34. 
2013:383     Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis 401 
The conventional IAD framework is described by the following 
Chart72: 
 
CHART 1  
CONVENTIONAL IAD FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
The focal unit of analysis is the “action arena” (Ostrom came to 
prefer the label “action situation,” which she used in the context of the 
subsequently developed Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework)73 
in which collective (cooperative or noncooperative) decisions are made, 
resulting (or not) in collective action. Utilizing a structural system she 
derived together with her husband Vincent,74 depicted in Chart 2 below,75 
action arenas arise at three different levels of social choice: (1) the 
constitutional-choice level at which the meta-rules of the game (the rules 
for making rules) are chosen; (2) the collective-choice level at which the 
operating rules of the game are specified in accordance with the 
 
 72. ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 37 
(1994). A slightly revised version of the same figure appears in Elinor Ostrom, Beyond 
Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. 
ECON. REV. 641, 646 (2010). 
 73. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability 
of Social-Ecological Systems, 325 SCI. 419 (2009). 
 74. See Larry L. Kiser & Elinor Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action: A 
Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches, in STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL 
INQUIRY 179–80 authors’ n. (Elinor Ostrom ed., 1982); Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, 
Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration, 31 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 203, 211–12 (1971). For an application of the “three worlds of action,” see 
OSTROM, supra note 34, at 52. 
 75. Paul A. Sabatier, Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process, 24 PS: POL. 
SCI. & POL. 147, 152 fig.2 (1991). 
402 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
meta-rules established at the constitutional-choice level; and (3) the 
operational level, where social interactions allocate entitlements to 
resources and result in (or fail to result in) collective action on social 
dilemmas (or social-cost problems) in accordance with the social 
“prescriptions” or “rules” established at the collective-choice and 
constitutional-choice levels.76 
 
  
 
 76. Id. at 151. 
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CHART 2: LEVELS OF SOCIAL CHOICE 
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 At the operational level, an action arena may be a market, a court, 
a media outlet, a legislative chamber, a tribal council, a neighborhood 
meetinghouse, a church, a virtual locus in cyberspace, or a home. At the 
constitutional- and collective-choice levels, the set of action arenas 
usually excludes markets (although political arenas are often described 
by public choice scholars as markets),77 but includes a wide variety of 
other forums. Collective-choice level action arenas include Congress (for 
all imaginable purposes, it is better described as an action arena, in which 
the relevant actors are legislators, rather than as an actor itself or as an 
organization for that matter),78 the respective houses of Congress, 
legislative committees within each of those houses (wherein actors are 
committee chairs, members, representatives of groups appearing before 
them, etc.), party caucuses, parallel arenas at state and local levels of 
government, and corporate and club boardrooms. At the constitutional 
level, action arenas include (but are not necessarily limited to): Congress, 
state legislative bodies, constitutional conventions, ratifying conventions, 
town halls, and meetings at which articles of incorporation or corporate 
bylaws are debated and adopted. 
In any given action arena (or situation), participants (the actors) are 
influenced (or incentivized) by many variables, including the biophysical 
attributes of the resources (relative scarcity, boundary conditions, 
rivalrousness of use, excludability, etc.) about which they are making 
decisions; the attributes of their own community (e.g., population size 
and relative homo- versus hetero-geneity, and various positions held by 
different actors), and the collective-choice rules in use (that is, rules that 
are actually enforced within the action arena). The outcomes of social 
interactions, along with evaluations of those outcomes by social actors, 
subsequently feed back into the variables that affect decision making. So, 
failure to resolve a certain collective action problem, such as 
conservation of a common-pool resource, in the relevant action arena 
will impact on the biophysical attributes of that resource. And, if that 
outcome is evaluated to be bad, based on some agreed criterion such as a 
social-welfare function, it could (but might not) lead to institutional 
change(s) at the collective-choice level. In addition, decisions taken at 
various levels of choice can lead to changes in the composition (i.e., 
 
 77. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 19–20 (1962); 
Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice Economics, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN 
ECONOMICS 285, 290–91 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994). 
 78. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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attributes) of the community, as some members of the community, for 
example, might vote with their feet, exercising the option of exit.79 
Ostrom’s IAD framework has proven useful for developing and 
testing theories and models of social interactions and their consequences 
for both resource systems and institutions (or, put differently, for 
coproduced SESs).80 To a substantial extent, its utility is derived from its 
compatibility with a wide range of theories, models, and methods.81 It 
can accommodate models of bounded as well as complete rationality; it 
is particularly useful for creating and testing game-theoretic models, in 
part because of its strong differentiation of actors and institutions. Game 
theory, a method Ostrom found congenial because it provides predictions 
that can be tested experimentally in both the laboratory and the field, 
focuses on strategic decision making by actors in action arenas or 
situations at all social-choice levels. Among those strategic actors are 
organizations, which she defines as sets of “institutional arrangements 
and participants who have . . . common . . . goals and purposes.”82 Their 
actions are influenced by institutions—in Ostrom’s IAD framework, the 
“working rules,” which in game theory are the (often unspecified) factors 
that determine payoffs83—and the outcomes of their interactions (the 
 
 79. See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES 
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970); Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 420 (1956).  
 80. In recent years, Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis have shifted focus to an evolving outgrowth of the IAD 
framework, known as the SES framework, which focuses equal attention on ecological 
resource systems and human institutional systems, which greatly influence each other 
and, in effect, coproduce social-ecological outcomes. See John M. Anderies et al., A 
Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems from an Institutional 
Perspective, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 18 (2004). The SES framework, which remains a work 
in progress, is a more complex system based on nested sets of variables and subvariables, 
which can be deployed in theories and models to explain, more accurately than the IAD 
framework, the working parts of combined SES. Id.; see also Ostrom, supra note 73. 
 81. In Ostrom’s methodology, frameworks are the highest, most generally 
applicable systems. They provide the grammar and structure for constructing subsidiary 
theories and testable models. See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 27–29. 
 82. Margaret M. Polski & Elinor Ostrom, An Institutional Framework for 
Policy Analysis and Design, WORKSHOP POL. THEORY & POL’Y ANALYSIS, 4 (June 15, 
1999), http://mason.gmu.edu/~mpolski/documents/PolskiOstromIAD.pdf. But see 
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 57 (“An organization is composed of one or more (usually 
more) action situations linked together by prescriptions specifying how outcomes from 
one situation become inputs into others. Organizations may be thought of as a tree or a 
lattice with situations at each node.”). On this conception, “organizations” are neither 
actors nor institutions, but constellations of action situations. This differs markedly from 
North’s definition of “organization,” but is not necessarily inconsistent with his definition 
of “institution,” which Ostrom embraces in the same work.  
 83. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Institutions Matter! Why the 
Herder Problem Is Not a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69 THEORY & DECISION 219 (2010) 
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“payoffs”) in turn influence institutions; but the actors are not, 
themselves, institutions. 
Ostrom’s IAD framework has not often been used for the normative 
purpose of choosing among alternative institutions or sets of institutions 
and organizations.84 That has been Komesar’s primary concern—to 
choose and institutionalize the best or least bad (that is, lowest-cost) 
means of dealing with some social-cost problem. Ostrom, by contrast, 
was primarily interested in explaining institutional-choice situations and 
predicting the success or failure of efforts to resolve social dilemmas 
depending on a wide variety of biophysical and social variables. Her IAD 
framework is, however, useful for comparative analyses because 
“success” and “failure” (based on whatever evaluative criteria) are 
relative concepts that depend on variables including (but not limited to) 
institutional choices, which are perforce comparable. So, specific 
applications of Ostrom’s IAD framework (using various theories and 
models) provide information to decision makers in collective-choice 
situations about which institutions or sets of institutions are more likely 
than others to facilitate “good” outcomes (whether defined in terms of 
resource conservation over time or a broader social-welfare function) in 
various operational-level action arenas. 
For example, a meta-analysis of dozens of specific case studies in 
Governing the Commons allowed Ostrom to develop a set of eight 
“design principles” for predicting the success or failure of that 
institutional solution in other cases.85 The more closely conditions in the 
action situation approximate Ostrom’s “design principles” (a phrase she 
grew to dislike, but for which she never found a satisfactory alternative), 
the more likely a common property regime is to succeed. Conversely, the 
more the situation deviates from the “design principles,” the less likely a 
common property regime is to succeed.86 Ostrom’s approach cannot 
 
(criticizing game theorists who do not pay sufficient attention to the institutions that 
structure the payoffs in games). 
 84. Some of Ostrom’s work in the period just prior to elaboration of the IAD 
framework was directly comparative. For instance, she conducted carefully constructed 
(and subsequently replicated) large-n field studies comparing the performance of 
consolidated (large) and polycentric (small and medium) municipal police departments, 
finding that the then-standard assumption of economies of scale from consolidation of 
small departments was generally unwarranted. See Elinor Ostrom & Gordon P. Whitaker, 
Community Control and Government Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black 
Neighborhoods, in IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF URBAN MANAGEMENT 303 (Willis D. 
Hawley & David Rogers eds., 1974) [hereinafter Ostrom & Whitaker, Community 
Control]; Elinor Ostrom & Gordon Whitaker, Does Local Community Control of Police 
Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48 (1973). 
 85. See OSTROM, supra note 34, at 89–102. 
 86. For a large-scale empirical study supporting Ostrom’s “design principles,” 
see Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 38 (2010). 
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predict whether private-property or public-property/regulatory solutions 
(however defined) necessarily would be any more or less successful in 
cases where the “design principles” are generally satisfied, but on the 
principle of subsidiarity implicit in the Ostroms’ polycentric approach to 
social policy making, local solutions should be preferred to solutions 
from more distant social choice forums, whenever the “design 
principles” generally are satisfied (all else being equal).87 In many cases 
at least, this presumption seems likely to be consistent with a Coasean 
comparative transaction-cost analysis and, therefore, with Komesar’s 
approach to CIA.88 
Indeed, Ostrom’s approach might even provide a basis for bridging 
the gulf that seemingly separates Komesar’s approach to CIA from 
North’s approach. Specifically, although Ostrom (for the most part) 
follows North’s restrictive definition of “institution,” her conception of 
“action arenas” seems to match Komesar’s predominant concern with 
decision-making processes as the focal points of analysis. For example, a 
legal dispute in a courtroom is a decision-making process for Komesar 
and an action arena for Ostrom. If we treat Komesar’s decision processes 
as action arenas, it becomes possible to separate out institutions as the 
rules that structure interactions and decisions in the judicial action arena, 
as well as the outputs of decisions emerging from the judicial action 
arena, rather than treating the adjudicatory process itself as an institution. 
Even if Ostrom does not completely bridge the difference between 
Komesar and North,89 her approach to institutional analysis cannot be 
adjudged better or worse than any other, except on an inherently 
subjective valuation of the utility of alternative approaches for 
 
 87. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 32, at 281–86 (addressing the comparative 
advantages and limits of polycentric systems); Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of 
Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 
832, 837–38, 842 (1961). 
 88. As Alexis De Tocqueville put it, “the collective strength of the citizens will 
always be more powerful for producing social well-being than the authority of the 
government.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 153 (Eduardo Nolla 
ed., James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2010) (1835). Tocqueville obviously 
was not contemplating problems of externality or potential scale economies in 
governance. The most efficient level of governance always depends on a variety of cost 
factors, but Elinor Ostrom’s empirical research suggests that claims of scale economies in 
governance are often exaggerated and sometimes false. See, e.g., Ostrom & Whitaker, 
Community Control, supra note 84. See generally Richard C. Feiock, A Transaction Cost 
Theory of Federalism (Fla. State Univ., Program in Local Governance Working Paper, 
n.d.), available at http://localgov.fsu.edu/readings_papers/readings_miscellaneous.htm.  
 89. Ostrom never applied her IAD framework to study legal action situations 
per se. And it is not obvious how that framework might confront social choices among 
alternative action arenas, which is of course of central concern to Komesar.  
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understanding how humanly devised systems function,90 and the extent 
to which that understanding facilitates “better” (defined in accordance 
with some evaluative criteria) social choices among institutional 
alternatives. 
Komesar and Ostrom have both contributed greatly to the 
development of CIA in their respective domains of scholarly interest. 
Their approaches have provided immensely important and useful insights 
not just for policy makers and policy analysts but for future generations 
of scholars, who will continue to build on the foundations they have 
established, whether by trying to consolidate and unify their approaches 
or simply by extending and/or improving upon their respective 
approaches to institutional analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Neil Komesar has written that he has spent decades in a 
“wilderness” (albeit a pleasant one), apart from mainstream legal 
scholarship, pursuing his sometimes lonely quest to improve institutional 
analysis for legal-policy choice.91 I suspect many, if not most, other 
interdisciplinary scholars have similar feelings of alienation from their 
home disciplines. What I have tried to show in this Article is that 
Komesar actually has many friends among the various social sciences, 
who have been working on more or less compatible approaches to CIA, 
while Komesar has been plowing his lonely furrow in the legal academy. 
An ever-increasing number of sociologists, international studies scholars, 
anthropologists, economists, political scientists, public-policy analysts, 
and even a few other legal scholars have, over the past decades, 
developed and applied various approaches to CIA. Many universities 
today offer courses in institutional analysis, using a variety of texts, 
 
 90. In this context, a “system” may be defined as an equilibrium set of 
(Northian) institutions and organizations. 
 91. Neil K. Komesar, The Logic of Law and the Essence of Economics: 
Reflections on 40 Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265. Interestingly, for much 
of their careers Elinor and Vincent Ostrom felt alienated from their fellow political 
scientists, who for a long time grossly underestimated the value of their research 
approach and scholarly contributions. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Long Polycentric 
Journey, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2010) (“My research interests took me down a long 
and interdisciplinary path to the study of complex social-ecological systems—a path that 
many colleagues in political science strongly criticized. . . . A political scientist was 
expected to study the parliaments or bureaucracies of national or international regimes 
and not the design, operation, and adaptation of rule systems at lower levels.”). They 
founded the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in 
1973, in part, as an interdisciplinary haven from the academic confines of their home 
department (political science).  
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including specialized textbooks and handbooks,92 which usually 
incorporate a sizeable comparative element. Some of these books also 
cross disciplinary boundaries and compare alternative approaches to 
institutional analysis.93 
The need remains for more and better communication among 
scholars who use one or another form of CIA in various disciplines, not 
necessarily to develop a single, unified theory and approach to CIA, but 
at least to compare notes and learn from one another. It is long past time 
that scholars from across academic disciplines started talking more with 
one another to probe both common ground and differences in both goals 
and methods.94 
 
 
 92. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS (Glenn Morgan et al. eds., 2010); SCOTT, supra note 21. 
 93. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 21. 
 94. Indiana University is home to a nearly forty-year-old center devoted to just 
such interdisciplinary endeavors: the Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis. On the importance and difficulties of interdisciplinary 
cooperation, based largely on lessons learned over more than three decades of 
collaboration and contestation at the Ostrom Workshop, see AMY R. POTEETE, MARCO A. 
JANSSEN & ELINOR OSTROM, WORKING TOGETHER: COLLECTIVE ACTION, THE COMMONS, 
AND MULTIPLE METHODS IN PRACTICE (2010). 
